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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
HELEN C. EMERY, as guardian ad litem for
Brent Wesley Varley, Patrick J. Varley and
Mark Robert Varley, minors; and CHRISTINE VARLEY,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
VS.

THE STATE OF UTAH, a sovereign, and
JOHN DOE; whose true names are unknown, agents and employees of the State
of Utah at the Utah State Hospital,

Case No.
12173

Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a summary judgment
dismissing appellant's complaint. Appellant originally brought an action for wrongful death against
the State of Utah and its agents and employees of
the Utah State Hospital.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court granted the respondent's
motion for summary judgment, finding that the

2
Utah State Hospital is an institution of legal confinement and that plaintiff's decedent was confined
therein at the time of the trauma which ultimately
resulted in her death. As such, Utah Code Ann.
63-30-10 (10) (Repl. Vol. 1968), cannot be construed
to waive the defense of sovereign immunity thus
barring plaintiff's action.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Respondents seek a judgment affirming
the decision of the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts contained in the brief of
the appellant is accurate and a further statement
will not be made by respondent except as necessary
in presenting his argument.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE UTAH STATE HOSPITAL IS A PLACE OF
LEGAL CONFINEMENT: A PATIENT OF THE UTAH
STATE HOSPITAL IS CONFINED THEREIN REGARD·
LESS OF THE METHOD OF ADMISSION.

The Utah State Hospital is not a penal institu·
tion. It exists for the purpose of treating the mentally
ill. A patient may be admitted to the hospital in sev·
eral different ways, but the manner of admission
does not determine the nature of the institution.
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The Supreme Court of Montana¢' in State ex rel.

Hoatson v. District Court of Thirteenth Judicial District et al.

26 P.2d 172 (1933) stated that in determining whether
the rights of a person committed to an insane
asylum were denied the court should be governed
by the substance of the matter and not by the form
of proceeding. The court in the case at hand should
be concerned with the real purpose of the Utah State
Hospital and not with the form of admission thereto.
In Mabry v. Mabry, 243 N.C. 126, 90 S.E.2d 221
(1955), the supreme court of North Carolina recognized that a patient in a mental hospital was confined.
"Mere confinement for a period of five successive years in such an institution would
fulfill the literal meaning of the statute but it
would not be in compliance with its spirit or
purpose. . . . Certainly by the use of the word
'confined' in the statute, the Legislature did not
contemplate such confinement as would require
an inmate to be at all times under lock and
key." (Id. at 223.)

The court in Mabry held that temporary releases of
an insane husband on probation from the state hospital did not terminate his period of confinement
within the hospital and as such granted his wife a
divorce based upon insanity. In construing the
statute involved the court looked at the purpose behind the statute rather than the literal words.
Utah Code Annotated Sec. 64-7-32 (Repl. Vol.
1968) sets out four methods of admission. In the case
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at hand the patient was referred to the hospital by
her doctors yet personally requested admission.
Patients may also be sent to the hospital from the
prison, by the courts to determine insanity during
criminal proceedings, and by the other methods disclosed by the statute.
Once the patient is incarcerated, protection of
his civil rights is merely in keeping with our traditional respect of the individual. The procedural differences in obtaining admission and release are
obviously designed to encourage those who are
mentally ill but aware of their needs to seek help
without the difficulties imposed by judicial commitment and to request release when they believe their
problems are controlled or solved.
"By eliminating informal processes of
permanent commitment, practitioners would be
encouraged to have their patient seek voluntary admission to mental hospitals. This in itself would be a desireable result since a person
who has placed himself in a hospital is more
likely to respond to treatment." Jaffe, "Civil
Commitment of the Mentally Ill," 107 U. Penn.
L. Rev. 668, 684 (1959).
"Voluntary hospitalization is clearly the
most desirable p r o c e d u r e both from the
legal and the medical points of view. From the
legal viewpoint, it obviates the difficult problems of due process which are the primary subject of this note. From the medical point of
view, it obviates the inevitable antagonisms
inherent in confinement, thus increasing the
chances for whole hearted cooperation between
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patient and therapist." Thurman, "Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill in Utah," 1966 Utah
L. Rev. 223, 224. (Emphasis supplied.)

It is clear that even in voluntary hospitalization the
true nature of a mental institution is well understood
and a primary force behind voluntary commitment
is to avoid "the inevitable antagonisms inherent in
confinement" increasing the likelihood of a patient's
reesponse to treatment. (Id. at 224.)

Section 64-7-31 of the Utah Code Ann. (Repl. Vol.
1968) deals with the release of voluntary patients
from the Utah State Hospital. Paragraph (3) of Section 64-7-31 specifically gives to the superintendant
of the hospital the power to hold a voluntary patient
for further observation, providing the superintendent makes application to the district court within forty-eight hours.
It should be noted that the language used with
the discharge of both voluntary and involuntary patients is direct-"release". Ballentine's Law Dictionary (Third Edition, 1969) defines "release" to mean:
"A discharge from duty or from confinement as a prisoner." (Emphasis supplied.)

Unless a person has been confined or incarcerated
it is impossible for him to be released.
A person who is not at liberty to move about as
he may choose is confined or incarcerated. This
may be by his own choice or it may be compelled.
In the case at hand the patient voluntarily admitted
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herself to the hospital; having done so she became
subject to the powers, restraints, and confinement
inherent in the institution. Her "release" from the
institution was not automatic upon her request but
was subject to the discretion of the superintendent.
The incarceration exists by virtue of the fact that the
institution here involved locks its doors and confines its patients who are "released" by the institution in accordance with the judgment of the superintendent.
The Utah State Hospital is a place of legal confinement: A patient of the Utah State Hospital is
confined therein regardless of the method of admission.
POINT II
AN ACTION AGAINST THE . STATE OF UTAH
FOR AN ALLEGED ACT ON THE PART OF ITS
AGENTS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE UTAH STATE
HOSPITAL IS BARRED BY THE ABSOLUTE DEFENSE
OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY.

The basic doctrine is that the sovereign is immune from suit. This immunity may be waived but
the waiver is not to be implied. The Utah State Legislature has dealt with immunity in a number of
ways but it is clear that immunity from suit is not
waived in cases which arise out of incarceration or
other place of legal confinement. Section 63-30-10
(10) of Utah Code Ann. (Repl. Vol. 1968) provides
that negligently caused injuries arising "out of" the
incarceration of any person in any state prison,
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county or city jail, or other place of legal confinement are not actionable against the government.
The legislature has not limited this section to
cases which arise out of penal institutions, but rather
specifically mentions penal institutions and then
through the use of the words "or other place of legal
confinement" extends the statutory coverage. A recent Utah Law Review article admitted that it is not
clear what is meant by the term incarceration. "The
meaning of 'other places of legal confinement' is
similarly in doubt, although other states have provision which indicate an intent to include hospitals
and mental institutions." Creer, "The Utah Governmental Immunity Act: An Analysis", 1967 Utah L. Rev.
129, 146. (See Cal. Gov't Code Sections 854.8, 855.6,
855.8, 856 (Supp. 1965); Ill. Ann. Stat. Ch. 85, Sections
6-101 to -109 (Smith-Hurd 1966).
Special note should be taken of cases which
have arisen under the California Government Code.
The Supreme Court of California, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Traynor, held that a provision
in the state statutes prohibiting an action by a patient in a mental hospital did not deny the patient of
equal protection of the laws on the ground that the
county would have been directly liable if the patient
had been injured in a medical ward rather than in a
mental ward. County of Los Angeles v. The Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, 44 Cal. Rptr. 796, 402 P.2d 868
(1965).
The court in Goff v. County of LosAngeles, et al.,
61 Cal. Rptr. 840 (1967) held, among other things,
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that a statute providing for governmental immunity
for injury to any person committed or admitted to a
mental institution should not be declared unconstitutional.
The Utah State Legislature has, for reasons sufficient to itself, not limited the statutory language involved to only those cases arising from penal institutions .. In the absence of such exclusionary language their intent must be deemed to include other
places of legal confinement such as those involved
in the case at hand.
"The Legislature has broad discretion in
making classifications, and its decision will be
upheld unless the classification has no reasonable relationship to any proper legislative purpose." County of Los Angeles v. The Superior
Court of Los Angeles County, 44_ Cal. Rptr.
796 at 800 ( 1965).
"In limiting governmental liability for the
operation of mental institutions the Legislature
could appropriately consider the special problems of diagnosis and treatment in the field of
mental illness, the problems of excessive patient
load in public mental institutions that must
take all patients committed to them, and the
problems that may arise with respect to the
competency of the mentally ill as witnesses....
We cannot say that such factors are insufficient
to justify the Legislature in treating mental
patients as a class by themselves. . . . " (Id.
at 800.)
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CONCLUSION
The legislature has not seen fit to waive immunity in the type of case at hand and the defense of
sovereign immunity is therefore absolute. The decision of the lower court holding that the Utah State
Hospital is an institution of legal confinement and
that plaintiff's decedent was confined therein at the
time of the trauma which ultimately resulted in her
death should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

JOSEPH P. McCARTHY
Chief Assistant Attorney
General
Attorney for Respondent

